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I. Introduction 
 
 On March 5, 2012, the not-for-profit organization Invisible Children launched its Kony 
2012 campaign in the form of a YouTube video, directed by Jason Russell, which received 
nearly 100 million views in its first six months. Kony 2012 was essentially a call to arms, to both 
citizens and governments alike, to track down and capture Joseph Kony, leader of the Lord’s 
Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda, who had been indicted by the International Criminal Court, 
by the end of the year. Although Kony and the LRA have not been particularly active in recent 
years, the video created a lively discussion throughout the United States, in particular, 
concerning the role of the US in the affairs of Africa. It raised further questions in society about 
the uses of not only military aid as a means of stopping the LRA, but also humanitarian aid as a 
means of aiding the Ugandans affected and displaced by Kony. 
Although Sub-Saharan Africa may not have been a topic of discussion among the general 
populace until the release of Kony 2012, the region has long garnered the attention of 
humanitarian and developmental organizations as a result of its low levels of economic 
development, unstable, corrupt governments, and seemingly unending conflict. International 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and government organizations alike have funneled 
billions of dollars into the region with high hopes of encouraging development and 
democratization, looking for inspiration to the actions of international financial institutions such 
as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in Latin America during the latter 
decades of the 20th century. 
After the increasing levels of foreign aid and intervention that has been directed at Sub-
Saharan Africa, the country has seen improvements across the board in terms of economic and 
social development and political democratization. That said, the majority of the continent is still 
!"#$$%&'()*& ,&
impoverished and controlled by authoritarian leaders (though many operate under the guise of 
democratic elections). For example, in 2011, the majority of countries in Africa received a Polity 
IV ranking of 5 or fewer. Of these, about half received rankings below 1. The scale indexes 
countries based on the competitiveness and openness of their elections, ranging from -10 (highly 
autocratic) to 10 (highly democratic. The continent of Africa, therefore, is composed primarily of 
anocracies (both closed and open). Further, the continent is characterized by a number of 
ongoing conflicts, including those with the Boko Haram in Nigeria and the Tuaregs in Niger and 
Mali. This raises the question of why foreign aid has not resulted in a more socially, politically, 
and economically developed, peaceful Africa. 
 Previous research has dealt primarily with development and military aid and their effects 
on economic development and democratization in the region. While theoretical evidence 
suggests that humanitarian aid, unlike democracy aid, has overwhelmingly negative 
consequences in terms of the duration of conflict (LeRiche 2004, Lischer 2003), there has been 
little scholarship on the subject. In a world in which new NGOs emerge every day with the goal 
of providing food and clean water to those in impoverished countries and regions of conflict, it is 
imperative that we understand fully both the intended and the unintended consequences of this 
humanitarian aid. In this respect, my research represents a departure from existing literature. 
 In the following essay, I attempt to discern why it is that humanitarian aid results in an 
increase in the length of conflict. First, I will survey the existing literature on the subject, 
drawing on the work of notable political scientists who have conducted research in fields of 
conflict and foreign aid, and determine where, precisely, my research fits into the gaps in the 
current pool of scholarship. Then, I will describe the theoretical causal mechanism used to 
explain why humanitarian aid increases conflict duration. Next, I will outline my research design 
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and assess the empirical results. Finally, I consider two case studies as a means of qualitatively 
demonstrating the ways in which my findings can be applied. 
  
II. Literature Review 
 
Conflict Theory 
 The literature is rich with discussion of what causes intrastate conflict everywhere, 
including within Africa. Collier and Hoffler (2000) compare the two main models of rebellion: 
greed and grievance. The latter they compare to a protest and describe as being motivated by 
ethnic or religious differences or economic inequality, with the goal of appeasing their grievance; 
the former, they compare to organized crime and describe as being motivated by rent-seeking 
behavior (4). Rent-seeking behavior can be defined as “the socially costly pursuit of winning a 
contestable prize” (Economides, et al 2008, 464). In other words, insurgencies arise, according to 
the greed model, because governments and insurgents seek monetary acquisition for themselves 
and for their followers; their goal is economic profit, not policy change. Collier and Hoffler 
tested both models statistically, and found that most of the proxies for the grievance model were 
insignificant, whereas the greed model “performs well” (26). This means that more conflicts 
begin as a result of rent-seeking behavior, rather than as a direct effect of inequality. 
 Collier and Hoffler’s greed-based account can be used to explain another phenomenon of 
human behavior that appears a little more frequently in the literature: moral hazard. Moral hazard 
is, in a general sense, the tendency to engage in risky behavior because the costs incurred will 
not be borne by the risk-taker. In the context of conflict, moral hazard begins when a government 
or an insurgent receives a large amount of aid. The knowledge that this aid flow will continue 
creates perverse incentives within the government or the leadership of the insurgency to spend 
these funds irresponsibly (Bräutigam 2000, 3). Moral hazard, in this case, is supported by the 
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rent-seeking incentives described in Collier and Hoffler’s greed theory: rent-seeking leads rulers 
to engage in risky behavior because they know that, if they do so, they will still continue to 
receive aid. In many African countries, where government institutions are weak and transparency 
is all but inexistent, moral hazard serves as a particularly strong problem, due to the culture of 
rent seeking. Bräutigam notes that rentier states have “little incentive to improve state capacity” 
(25) because the flow of revenue depends not on taxes raised from citizens and domestic 
businesses, but on foreign aid, which flows almost continuously in some states. This creates a 
moral hazard problem in which governments inefficiently allocate their revenues, fail to find 
alternative sources of revenue, and remain dependent on foreign aid sources to fund government 
activities. 
 Moral hazard plays a major role in both the initiation and the duration of conflict. For 
example, Kuperman (2008) explains that rebel leaders, in many cases, are more likely to arm 
their followers and secede from the state because they expect that, should the state attempt to 
violently suppress them, the international community will intervene on their behalf (51). Further, 
he explains, insurgents have even been known to attack the state, deliberately provoking 
retaliation, so that they are able to achieve their political goals (which correspond with Collier 
and Hoffler’s greed theory) when the international community intervenes. 
 
Effects of Foreign Aid 
 There exists a great deal of scholarship surrounding the effects of democracy aid. Aid 
seems to have a positive impact on democratization. Knack (2004) used both the Freedom House 
combined political freedoms and civil liberties index, which ranks countries from 2 to 14 on 
aspects such as freedom of speech and free and fair elections that “represent informed citizen 
preferences” (254), and the Polity IV data set, which provides a 10-point index based on factors 
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such as institutional checks on executive power and competitiveness of elections. He found that 
foreign aid resulted in an increase in democratization, in terms of the Freedom House and Polity 
IV indices, in recipient countries due to the technical assistance used to strengthen electoral 
processes and judicial and legislative checks on executive power, and through improving 
education systems and increasing incomes. Goldsmith (2001) similarly concluded that high 
quantities of democracy aid resulted in statistically significant increases in levels of democracy, 
which she too defines on the basis of the Freedom House political freedoms index. 
By contrast, however, foreign aid has a negative impact on governance and economic 
development. Bräutigam and Knack (2004) describe the moral hazard problem that exists in 
many African states such that the receipt of foreign aid incentivizes governments to build up 
systems of patronage and to spend money inefficiently (263), all while reducing incentives for 
democratic accountability (265). Bräutigam and Knack conclude that large amounts of aid have a 
“robust statistical relationship” with deteriorations in governance. Economides et al (2008) 
concluded that high levels of aid actually do not result in economic growth. This is due to the 
incentives created by foreign aid that encourage rent seeking behavior, rather than productive 
economic activities. It is necessary to note that these studies tend to be inconclusive as a whole: 
some find positive relationships between democracy, governance, and growth and foreign aid, 
while others find negative relationships. 
These studies shine light on several fundamental characteristics of foreign aid and its 
distribution. Knack’s and Goldsmith’s findings, in contrast with Bräutigam and Knack’s and 
Economides’ seem to suggest that foreign aid can have positive effects if it is utilized efficiently 
in that it is channeled into institutions that strengthen the transparency and the accountability of 
the government in a given aid recipient country. However, if, instead, the primary use of foreign 
!"#$$%&'()*& 0&
aid is to appease the patronage systems of national and local leaders, the results in terms of 
economic development and democratization will be negative. 
 
Aid and Conflict 
 The literature is a little more decisive in regards to the effects of foreign aid on the 
duration of conflict in recipient states. There seems to be a consensus that democracy aid results 
in a decrease in violence. De Ree and Nilleson (2009) show that increasing democracy aid 
decreases the duration of a conflict that has already begun (they do not find a relationship 
between high levels of aid and the start of new conflicts). This is a highly significant 
relationship; a 10% increase in foreign aid results in an 8% decrease in continuation of conflict 
(312). They attribute this to the ability of governments to strengthen their armies by channeling 
funds received through foreign aid flows into military expenditures. Savun and Tirone (2011) 
echo this finding, concluding that the negative relationship between democracy aid and the 
probability of conflict during democratization is both statistically and substantively significant 
(242). 
 Nielson et al (2011) takes these findings one step further, claiming that democracy aid 
shocks—“severe decreases in aid revenues” (220)—result in a surge of violence. Aid shocks 
cause a sudden shift in the balance of power between governments and insurgents, creating a 
commitment problem in which governments can no longer credibly commit to provide resources 
to appease rebel groups. So, according to Neilson et al, foreign aid prevents conflict by 
promoting a balanced status quo that supports peace.  
 On the other hand, other scholars argue that humanitarian aid results in an increase in 
violence. Matthew LeRiche (2004) gives a theoretical account, supported by historical case 
studies, of rebels taking advantage of the humanitarian aid provided for victims of the 
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insurgency. Insurgents frequently, he writes, are treated at international aid clinics and gain 
access to food and supplies supplied for the wounded (106). There is a strategic aspect to these 
actions. Indeed, insurgents use scorched earth techniques in order to induce drought and famine, 
thus producing a need for aid provided by NGOs (108). Further, refugee camps allow 
governments to direct their funds to military expenditures, rather than humanitarian aid. With 
both militant groups and governments adequately supplied, conflicts can continue. Blouin and 
Pallage (2008) develop a model based on this idea that famine relief efforts, also known as food 
aid, inadvertently supply armies, and thus increase conflict. 
 Lischer (2003) echoes these findings, and suggests other causal mechanisms as well, 
using the case of the Rwandan genocide and the 1992-1995 war in Bosnia as examples. She 
considers four means by which humanitarian aid can exacerbate conflict. The first is that refugee 
relief can feed militants. The second is that it feeds and protects civilian supporters of militants. 
Third, it can contribute to the war economy. This consists of raiding warehouses and, if 
insurgency leaders or supporters control the distribution process, inflating population numbers 
and diverting the surplus resources toward military preparations (84). Finally, humanitarian aid 
can provide legitimacy to combatants in that aid organizations are often able to shape 
international opinion by simplifying the insurgencies into black and white conflicts (85). 
 It is important to note that, although LeRich, Blouin and Pallage, and Lischer all provide 
reasonable theoretical models to explain how humanitarian aid results in an increase in conflict, 
none of them tested their theories and hypotheses quantitatively, as I do in my research. 
 
 The previous literature surrounding the effects of foreign and humanitarian aid on the 
duration of conflict is highly troubling. Indeed, while it appears that democracy aid has a 
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statistically significant relationship with a decrease in conflict, humanitarian aid has the opposite 
effect, and actually results in an increase in violence. The literature also highlights a key idea: 
that a great deal of the problems associated with foreign aid result from the misuse and the 
misadministration of that aid (Lischer 2003; de Waal 1997). It becomes important, then, to 
pinpoint what implementation policies are effective at decreasing the duration of conflict and at 
efficiently and effectively distributing resources, and which are not. By doing so, we may 
develop a more efficient mechanism to administer humanitarian aid such that it minimizes the 
moral hazard problems that lead to further conflict. 
 
 
III. Theory 
 
 In reviewing the relevant literature, an important question arises: why is it that democracy 
aid, while it does not conclusively result in increased democracy or development, results in a 
shorter duration of conflict, whereas humanitarian aid results in increased length of insurgencies 
and civil wars? Further, are the causal mechanisms linking military and humanitarian aid to an 
increased conflict duration the same? These are obviously questions that must be answered 
definitively, so that international NGOs, private volunteer organizations, and governments do not 
continue wasting their resources by funneling money, food, and medical care into developing 
countries with the hopes of nourishing citizens, while actually fueling conflict. 
 Before the answer to this question can be explored, humanitarian aid must be defined. 
According to the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), humanitarian 
aid is foreign aid that is a direct response to “both natural and man-made disasters as well as 
problems resulting from conflict” (Tarnoff and Lawson 2012, 6). It consists of food and medical 
aid, and is provided to victims and refugees of these disasters and conflicts. It is frequently 
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administered by nongovernmental and private volunteer organizations. Sometimes, these NGOs 
and PVOs just supply the resources, and leave the responsibility of their distribution to local 
leaders; in other cases, they are responsible for both raising funds and distributing resources to 
victims and refugees. 
 With this key term defined conceptually, the theoretical causal mechanisms driving the 
relationships between foreign aid and conflict duration may be explained. We must consider first 
why it is that humanitarian aid increases the duration of conflict, and second why it is that other 
types of aid, namely democracy aid, as explored by researchers such as de Ree and Nilleson, 
Savun and Tiron, and Nielson et al, described previously, have the opposite effect. Consistent 
with the literature, I will first attempt to justify this difference on the basis of moral hazards.  
 The knowledge of the vast quantity of resources available to be exploited for military 
purposes creates perverse incentives for rebelling militant groups. Knowing that humanitarian 
aid will be administered under certain conditions, insurgents will be faced with a moral hazard 
problem, in which they will seek to generate conditions that will entice international NGOs into 
distributing humanitarian aid in the area. For example, militants will engage in scorched earth 
techniques in order to destroy all of the crops in a region, thus inducing famine (LeRiche 2004, 
108). Once a system of humanitarian aid is securely in place, they will utilize the available 
resources in order to continue the conflict. 
 Military aid, similarly, creates a moral hazard problem. Military aid to governments tends 
to increase in response to conflicts as a means of increasing the strength of a regime’s armed 
forces, empowering it to put down the insurgency without international support. This aid is 
invaluable to developing countries, as it frequently involves high-tech weapons and advanced 
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military training. Therefore, government leaders have an incentive to continue the conflict, so 
that the flow of international military aid continues (Bapat 2011, 303). 
 Why does democracy aid, in contrast, not result in a lengthening of conflict? Democracy 
aid, as explained previously, can result in a shortened duration of conflict because it strengthens 
government institutions. Indeed, democracy aid is channeled into strengthening education and 
electoral processes. Education leads to an increased demand for transparency in government, 
while improved electoral processes provide the means for increased transparency and 
accountability. Citizens will then gain confidence in the government, which will be strengthened 
and better able to put down rebellions. It is also important to consider the nature by which 
democracy aid is administered. Indeed, in most cases, a country must request democracy aid 
before it is delivered (Burnell 2013, 83). This implies that a country receiving democracy aid is 
already committed to democratization and, therefore, has the preconditions for shorter duration 
of conflict. 
The presence of democracy aid does not have a particularly extreme impact on moral 
hazard in the government in regards to the continuation of conflict. Intuitively, this makes sense. 
Because democracy aid is not applied as a means of combating insurgencies, but rather, is 
applied independently of conflict, increasing the duration of a conflict will not increase the 
amount of aid received. The government, therefore, has little incentive to continue an ongoing 
insurgency. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that the differences between the emergence of a moral 
hazard problem as a result of the receipt of humanitarian, military, and democracy aid can be 
attributed to the conditionality of the aid. In other words, because humanitarian and military aid 
are conditional on (in that they increase as a result of) the persistence of a conflict, and 
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democracy aid is not, the former two types of aid create moral hazard problems in which the 
principle actors are incentivized to continue the conflict, whereas the latter type does not create 
these perverse incentives. 
 The next question that emerges is whether or not the existence of moral hazard alone is 
sufficient to justify an increase in the length of conflict. Operationally, this means analyzing 
other mechanisms present in humanitarian or military aid that could explain the resulting 
increase in conflict duration. The primary institutional difference here lies in the access and 
availability of aid resources, and the presence or absence of intermediaries in the government to 
distribute aid resources. Indeed, because of the tangibility of humanitarian aid in comparison to 
other forms of foreign aid, resources tend to be easily accessible to insurgents. In theory, the 
resources provided by military aid are not easily accessible to insurgent or civil society groups. 
Further, whereas humanitarian aid tends to be administered through NGOs or, occasionally, local 
leaders or groups in civil society, military aid is generally directly administered on a 
government-to-government basis. 
 I therefore hypothesize that, in a comparison of different types of foreign aid 
administered during times of civil war and other conflicts, humanitarian aid will result in an 
increased duration of conflict, whereas other types of aid will have the opposite effect. This is a 
result of both the initial conditionality of the granting of aid, which can result in the emergence 
of moral hazard problems within the government and insurgent groups, creating a resolve to 
continue conflict, and the later accessibility of this aid, which empowers rebel groups, creating 
the means to do so. &
IV. Research Design 
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 I performed my research in a two step process: the first, a quantitative analysis to confirm 
empirically that humanitarian aid does, in fact, result in longer duration of conflicts in Africa; the 
second, a qualitative case study analysis in order to determine why this relationship exists. 
 My data is taken primarily from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program/Peace Research 
Institute, Oslo (UCDP/PRIO) Armed Conflict Dataset and Global Humanitarian Assistance’s 
International Humanitarian Response Dataset. The former dataset includes detailed information 
on the actors involved in and the duration of civil conflicts since 1945. The latter provides the 
annual amounts of international humanitarian aid received by countries between 1995 and 2011, 
expressed in millions of 2011 US dollars. In addition to this merged dataset, I included a variety 
of developmental variables from the United Nations Development Program’s Human 
Development Indicators, as well as geographical indicators from Nathan Nunn’s and Diego 
Puga’s “Ruggedness” dataset. 
As an operational definition of conflict, I turn to the definition used in the Code Book of 
the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset. An armed conflict is: 
a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory 
where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is 
the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths. (1) 
It is important to differentiate between this definition of conflict and the definition utilized in 
other similar data sets, such as the Correlates of War project. Correlates of War provides 
information only for those conflicts that have resulted in 1,000 battle-related deaths. I plan to use 
the 25 deaths definition of conflict because, in Africa especially, many “contested 
incompatibilities” that meet every other requirement of the definition have fewer than the 1,000 
deaths required by the Correlates of War project. By requiring 1,000 deaths, many important 
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conflicts would be left out of consideration. Furthermore, it is important to note that, although 
the UCDP/PRIO definition specifies that “at least” one warring party is a government, I will only 
be considering those that involve exactly one government. In other words, I plan to study the 
effect of humanitarian aid only on the duration of civil wars. 
 According to UCDP, a conflict begins on “the date… of the first battle-related death in 
the conflict,” and ends on the date in which the last battle-related death occurs. UCDP notes that, 
for many conflicts, there is no clear-cut start or end event; the data, in some cases, therefore, 
represents the best available estimation. It is crucial to note that the UCDP/PRIO dataset includes 
dates for both conflicts and conflict episodes. Whereas conflicts involve an overarching goal 
between two (or more) sides, episodes are merely instances of violence, baked within conflicts. 
One conflict can have multiple episodes that occur over different periods of time. This 
distinction has important theoretical implications for my findings. I do not hypothesize that an 
increase in humanitarian aid will result in a longer period of time before an insurgent group 
achieves its political ends; rather, I instead hypothesize that increased aid causes longer spells of 
violence. 
 Because of the relatively small number of observations in the dataset (N=219 in the full 
model), the list of independent variables employed is far from exhaustive, in order to maintain a 
high enough number of degrees of freedom to perform a statistical analysis. The primary 
independent variable is a logged function of the total amount of humanitarian aid received in a 
country in a given year, from any source. This variable is logged for two reasons: the first, 
statistical; the second, substantive. Statistically, values for levels of humanitarian aid are highly 
skewed to the right. Logging the aid variable, therefore, reduces a great deal of the skewness in 
the data, better enabling it to be approximated with a normal distribution. Substantively, to a 
!"#$$%&'()*& +.&
country that receives only a small amount of humanitarian aid, for instance, $500,000, an 
increase of an additional $500,000 is a lot. To a country that receives a larger amount, for 
instance, $5,000,000, this $500,000 is next to negligible. Logging the aid variable, therefore, 
makes interpretation of coefficients more generalizable because they can be interpreted as 
percent changes. 
 The first control variable included in the model is per capita GDP. It has been shown that 
poorer countries are more likely to be engaged in conflict. This relationship occurs for several 
reasons. First, insurgencies are likely to arise for both greed and grievance reasons. Grievance-
motivated rebel groups emerge in response to economic inequality, high unemployment and 
inflation, and low standard of living. In these cases, the costs of fighting are lower than the cost 
of maintaining the status quo. Greed-motivated insurgencies occur similarly as leaders seek 
economic gain for themselves. Once these insurgencies have begun, poor states often lack the 
capacity and the resources to suppress them. 
 Per capita GDP values have not been provided for Somalia for the entire duration of this 
study, generating missing values for those observations. If these missing values were random, 
across multiple countries, they could be ignored; the regression could be utilized with these 
observations being dropped. However, there is nothing random about the omission of data for 
Somalia. The country has undergone constant conflict for more than two decades; it has been 
considered a failed state by the international community, because of the government’s inability 
to control its citizens. Eliminating Somalia from the survival analysis very well might be equated 
with systematically eliminating a key set of observations. I was able to obtain a predicted 
estimate of Somalia per capita GDP by running a simple OLS regression on each of the 
observations in the dataset. The dependent variable used was per capita GDP; the independent 
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variables were life expectancy at birth, per capita carbon dioxide emissions, and the rate of cell 
phone contracts in the population. Each of the independent variables were taken from the United 
Nations Development Program’s HDI website; every variable that reported data for Somalia was 
included in the regression. The results of this regression are shown in TABLE 1. The R-square 
value of the regression model is 0.9566, suggesting that the predicted values of Somalia’s per 
capita GDP are accurate estimates; the model describes 95.66% of the variation in the dependent 
variable. 
 I next control for the geographical composition of the countries using a variable for the 
Terrain Ruggedness Index, originally developed by Riley, DeGloria, and Elliot (1999), and 
utilized in Nunn and Puga’s “Ruggedness” dataset. The index is based on changes in elevation 
across a country, and is intended to serve as a proxy for how easily concealable wildlife habitats 
are for predators hunting their prey. 
 The remaining control variables are related to Collier and Hoffler’s greed theory. In 
Africa, much conflict is driven by desire to control natural resources. Further, Alao (2007) found 
that an abundance of natural resources in a country contributes to a longer conflict duration. 
Because of that, I include two dichotomous variables, oil and diamonds, coded 1 if the country 
has known reserves and production operations of the respective resource, and coded 0 otherwise. 
Due to Alao’s findings, I would expect these variables to have a significant effect on lengthening 
civil conflicts within Africa. 
 I perform a survival analysis on the data, in which a failure is defined as the end of an 
episode of a conflict (note that it is not, as previously discussed, the end of a conflict entirely). I 
employ a lognormal distribution in the regression. In a lognormal distribution, the hazard rate of 
a failure increases initially; after it reaches a certain threshold, however, it decreases. This 
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suggests that an insurgency is most likely to be stopped at its outset. The longer it survives, 
however, the more likely it is to endure (the lower the hazard rate). Theoretically, this seems 
viable. As time goes on, rebel groups are able to acquire more resources and more support; they 
gain more skills that enable them to survive. This is in contrast to, for instance, a Weibull 
distribution, in which the hazard rate increases more or less constantly as time goes on, which 
would suggest that insurgencies are more and more likely to be stopped, the longer they go on. 
This alternative seems less likely, both empirically, in that many insurgencies are unable to break 
into fully-fledged civil wars, and theoretically, in that, as described previously, rebel groups are 
able to learn and adapt as time goes on. 
 The final regression equation utilized is, therefore: 
  duration= a+ b1(log(aid))+ b2(capitagdp)+ b3(rugged)+ b4(oil)+ b5(diamond) 
 Finally, I divide the data into three separate models: North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, 
and a full model combining the two. I do this as a means of discerning whether or not there is 
something inherent in Sub-Saharan Africa that makes it more conflict-prone than North Africa; if 
there is, employing separate models offers a way of determining where these divergences exist 
and, potentially, a means for attempting to combat them in future application of humanitarian aid 
in the region.  
 
V. Results and Analysis 
 
 The results of the analysis on the full model can be found in TABLE 2. Results from the 
model that dropped the observations in Somalia are on the left of the table; those from the model 
employing the estimates for Somalia are on the right. There is little difference between the two, 
suggesting that the relationship between the variables is strong both with and without the 
Somalia observations. Each cell lists the coefficient associated with each variable, as well as the 
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standard error. Variables with a p-value of less than 0.1 are denoted with one asterisk; those with 
a p-value of less than 0.05, with two asterisks; and those with a p-value of less than 0.001, with 
three asterisks. 
 The logged transformation of humanitarian aid is statistically significant in all versions of 
the model, at a 95% confidence level or higher. Because the model employed is of an accelerated 
failure-time form, the coefficients can be interpreted as proportional increases or decreases in the 
time it takes to reach a failure as a result of the presence of a given variable. This means that, in 
the full model with Somalia estimates, for instance, a one percent increase in humanitarian aid, 
expressed in 2011 prices, results in a failure 0.039 times longer than would occur without the aid. 
This supports the hypothesis that humanitarian aid results in an increased duration of conflict. 
Results from running the regression on data from North Africa and the full model can be 
found in TABLE 3. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the effect of humanitarian aid on conflict is much 
stronger than the average for Africa as a whole. A conflict in a Sub-Saharan African country that 
receives one percent more of humanitarian aid will endure almost 1.5 times as long as it would if 
it did not receive this aid. This relationship is also illustrated in FIGURE 1, which shows a plot 
of the hazard rates of the model at four different levels of humanitarian aid: 0, $19.600 million 
(the mean value minus one standard deviation), $55.231 million (the mean value), and $116.728 
(the mean value plus one standard deviation). As the graph suggests, the acquisition of 
humanitarian aid decreases the risk of a conflict ending. This graph also illustrates two other 
interesting points. First, the impact of humanitarian aid in perpetuating conflict is diminishing 
with each standard deviation increase in aid. Second, with the passing of time, hazard rates all 
converge to a level very close to zero, regardless of the level of aid received, suggesting that a 
conflict is more likely to end closer to its initiation. 
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 The North Africa model, interestingly enough, shows an opposite effect: a conflict in 
North Africa will be more than 3.5 times shorter if it receives humanitarian aid than if it does 
not. This could result from a number of things, including better-developed state institutions that 
hold leaders accountable to a more efficient allocation of resources. 
Some other variables are worth noting. First, per capita GDP is significant in the full 
model at more than a 99.9% confidence level. However, it is substantively insignificant; though 
the coefficient is positive, it is hardly higher than zero, suggesting that changes in per capita 
GDP have little effect on the duration of a conflict once it begins. It is possible that per capita 
GDP has the effect of decreasing the likelihood of the beginning of a conflict; however, that is 
out of the scope of this study. Second, although rugged is not significant in the full or Sub-
Saharan Africa models, it is negative and significant in the North African model. This means that 
for every point increase in the ruggedness index, a conflict is 41 times more likely to end It is 
worth noting that the ruggedness variable has a distribution that is highly skewed to the right. 
The median of the data is only 0.858, whereas the maximum value is 6.202. This suggests that 
very few countries will make that 1 point jump to result in such a severe decrease in the hazard 
rate. It is still interesting that the North Africa data points to a result contrary to what is in the 
literature about terrain and conflict. It could be that North Africa is an outlier in this respect, or, 
more probable, that elevation is not the sole geographical determinant of conflict length. Finally, 
neither oil nor diamonds are significant variables in any model. This outcome may have occurred 
because the existence of significant amounts of oil and diamonds may be embedded in other 
variables, such as per capita GDP, or assumptions inherent in the model (for example, in the 
North Africa model, both variables were left out of the regression because there was no variation 
in their values). 
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VI. Case Study 
 
 Now that the relationship between levels of humanitarian aid and the duration of conflict 
has been established, it is important to consider why, exactly, that relationship exists. This can be 
done through the use of case studies. Somalia offers a vivid picture of the role of humanitarian 
aid in fuelling civil conflict, through a comparison of the south-central region, centered around 
Mogadishu, and the northern regions of Somaliland and Puntland, since the early 1990s. 
Although Western critics have been quick to write off the entire country as a basket case, it 
remains true that northern Somalia, since the mid 1990s, has been relatively peaceful, relative to 
southern-central Somalia. This difference can be largely accounted for by attention from the 
international community in the form of humanitarian aid: whereas aid agencies played a vital 
role in contributing to the war economy in the southern regions in response to refugees and 
starved Somalis since the start of the conflict, they have been almost absent in the northern 
regions, until recently, giving Somaliland and Puntland opportunities to solve their own internal 
conflicts peacefully. Somalia also offers a nice case study because information is missing from 
almost all datasets used in this research because of this conflict. The missing data, therefore, is 
not random, but systematic, and studying the country qualitatively provides an opportunity to 
consider its characteristics that resulted in this missing data. 
 
The Conflict 
 In early 1991, the long-standing regime of Siyad Barre was toppled by a coalition of 
militant groups organized along clan lines (Lewis 2010, 215). General Mohamed Farah Hassan 
“Aideed,” a Habr Gidir, was given permission to establish a military wing of the United Somali 
Congress (USC) in Ethiopia (Drysdale 1994, 23). However, doing so alienated Ali Mahdi 
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Muhammad, leader of the USC’s Mogadishu faction, who feared that his own clan, the Hawiye, 
would lose its hold on the Barre opposition movement (24). Nonetheless, the two teamed up with 
the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), the Somali National Movement (SNM), an Isaaq clan-
based insurgent group in Somaliland, and the Somali Democratic Movement (SDM) (44). By 
December 29, 1990, the uprising against Barre had begun, and by April, Barre’s forces were 
driven out of the country. 
Mahdi was appointed as the interim president by the chairman of the Mogadishu faction 
of the USC, without the consultation of Aideed, the SNM, or the SPM (Drysdale 1994, 29). The 
effect was a complete division of southern Somalia along clan lines, devolution into complete 
anarchy, and the emergence of guerrilla warfare throughout Mogadishu and surrounding areas. 
Aideed refused to recognize Mahdi as president, and his forces took up arms against Mahdi’s 
(31). Meanwhile, the northwestern region of Somaliland unilaterally declared independence and 
entered into its own civil war (Bradbury 2008, 49) 
The Somali conflict has seen numerous international interventions and attempts at peace 
talks, but, even as late as early 2014, Somalia is still declared a failed state by the international 
community. The southern region has not seen peace since the start of the conflict. Further, 
despite Somaliland’s unilateral declaration of independence in 1991 and its proven commitment 
to peace and at least some degree of democracy, the international community fails to recognize it 
as sovereign. 
 
The Role of Humanitarian Aid 
 While it may be easy to accept the international community’s definition of the whole of 
Somalia as a failed state, to do so would be to overlook extreme internal differences within the 
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country. Indeed, although Somalia is uniformly poor, in terms of conflict, the autonomous 
regions of Somaliland, in the northwest, and Puntland, in the northeast, have seen relatively 
greater peace over the last twenty years than the remainder of the country, centered on 
Mogadishu, has. This difference can be attributed, in part, to the role that humanitarian aid has 
played in the country since more than ten years prior to the start of what is now known as the 
Somali Civil War. 
 In the late 1970s, the Somali National Army staged a large-scale invasion of Ethiopia’s 
Ogaden region, believing that the region rightfully belonged to them, as it was overwhelmingly 
populated by ethnic Somalis, and was only given to Ethiopia as the result of a British colonial 
treaty (Bradbury 2008, 27). The conflict ended when the Somali troops were forced back over 
the border as a result of sudden support by the Soviet Union for the Marxist regime in Ethiopia 
(Bradbury 2008, 39). Although the war lasted for less than a year, it created an estimated 1.5 
million refugees, approximately 40% of Somalia’s population at the time (Bradbury 2008, 39). 
The international community responded to the refugee situation by beginning humanitarian aid 
operations in Somalia (Frushone 2001, 13). Throughout the 1980s, Somalia received 
approximately $120 million per year in humanitarian assistance; nearly half of the population 
was able to access food aid (Bradbury 2001, 10-14).  
 A combination of events resulted in a redistribution of these humanitarian resources 
within Somalia. First, a famine in the south, in part a result of the combination of a drought and 
the start of armed conflict around Mogadishu, led to an influx of aid as nearly 1.5 million 
Somalis were left without access to food (Perlez 1992). Second, the Somali National 
Movement’s armed rebellion in the northwestern region of Somaliland, which began in 1988 and 
intensified after the fall of the Barre regime, posed a dangerous threat to humanitarian 
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organizations, and the result was a large-scale evacuation of foreign workers and, with them, the 
delivery of humanitarian aid (Bradbury 2001, 14). It is interesting to note here that, although it is 
often the case that humanitarian aid follows conflict (in other words, one would assume that the 
outbreak of conflict in Somaliland would have resulted in a further influx of aid), in contrast, aid 
organizations acted completely to the contrary in this case. This dynamic ultimately contributed 
to the relatively short length of the conflict in the north, particularly in comparison to the conflict 
in the south, which has been ongoing for more than twenty years. 
 By the time the coalition led by General Aideed toppled the Barre regime, the southern 
and central regions surrounding Mogadishu were receiving relatively high levels of humanitarian 
aid from international NGOs; these levels would only increase as the conflict progressed. By 
contributing to the war economy, the receipt of this aid played a role in the conflict’s long 
duration of, at the time of writing, more than twenty years, and counting. This occurred through 
several mechanisms. 
 First, and perhaps most apparently, rebel groups who were allowed access to aid were 
able to feed their armies at virtually no cost. Countless periodicals report attacks on aid workers 
by militias and looting of warehouses. In 1992, the United Nations estimated that only half of the 
food aid brought to Somalia by international NGOs actually reached the refugees and starved 
Somalis for whom it was intended (Perlez 1992). In this way, humanitarian aid serves as a direct 
means of fuelling the conflict, by providing rebel groups with supplies and therefore freeing up a 
large portion of their budget to spend on weaponry and other expenses instead. Further, in some 
cases stolen food has been resold in markets at inflated prices (Perez 1992). In many cases, the 
food is resold by citizens hoping to make a profit for themselves; however, militant groups also 
profit. 
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Diversion of aid by insurgents has been ongoing since the start of the conflict, and 
continues even to this day, though it has evolved in some senses. During the 2011 famine, for 
instance, this was particularly prevalent. Al Shabaab militants constructed a system requiring 
payments as high as $10,000 from international humanitarian aid agencies in order to gain access 
to certain war-ravaged regions of the country (Tran 2013). While such sophisticated systems of 
administration and duties, as well as the militant groups involved, are certainly deviations from 
the traditional methods of stealing from storage buildings by various opposing clan groups, the 
fact remains that insurgents are still, almost 25 years later, manipulating humanitarian aid and 
utilizing it to fuel the war economy. Moreover, competition for aid resources among opposing 
rebel groups also has the effect of further escalated conflict. 
Aid diversion is closely tied to the issue of moral hazard. To best understand this in the 
context of the Somali conflict, it is necessary to consider the clan dynamics, both in the south 
around Mogadishu, and in the northwest in Somaliland. 
 
Kinship 
The Somali people were historically pastoralists, organized along clan lines. Kinship was, 
for the Somalis, the “principle of social organization and the key to understanding politics” 
(Bradbury 2008, 13). Although the importance of kinship was altered, first with the emergence 
of statehood under colonial rule, and later as clan lines were manipulated by the Siyad Barre 
regime so that it could maintain its grasp on power (14), clans remained an important social tie. 
When the civil war erupted, there was a resurgence of organization along clan lines, as kinship 
affiliations filled the vacuum left by the state to serve as social safety nets. 
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As previously described, Mahdi and the Mogadishu faction of the USC were primarily 
Hawiyes, whereas Aideed and the Ethiopian faction of the USC were largely Habr Gidir. This 
distinction was crucial for explaining why the two groups went to war with one another after the 
defeat of Siyad Barre. Initially, Mahdi was upset when Aideed formed his own military wing of 
the USC, fearing that the Hawiyes would be alienated and lose their important role in the coup. 
Then, when Mahdi was appointed interim president without consulting Aideed, the latter refused 
to acknowledge his position. The result was a division within Mogadishu between pro-Mahdi 
Hawiye and pro-Aideed Habr Gidir forces (Drysdale 1994, 31). 
Somaliland, too, can be characterized by opposing clan groups during this time. The 
SNM was dominated by the Isaaq clan (Drysdale 1994, 136), and its military wing was originally 
organized along opposing sub-clan lines (Bradbury 2008, 69), most notably the Habar Yunis and 
the Ise Muse (Drysdale 1994, 72). Somaliland ultimately declared its independence in large part 
due to the alienation by the central government of the Isaaq clans. Somaliland was a British 
protectorate during the age of imperialism, until it was given independence in 1960. It existed as 
a sovereign state for five days, before joining with the then Italian administered UN Trust 
Territory of Somalia (Bradbury 2008, 32). Initially, Somaliland was as excited as the central 
government about the idea of a “Greater Somalia,” uniting all of the Somali people. 
However, over the next several decades, a series of events unfolded that caused the 
northwest region to become uneasy. First, in contrast to the great amount of power held by the 
Isaaq clan under British colonial rule, after joining Somalia, the Isaaqs became a minority (33). 
Second, the defeat of the Somali National Army to the Ethiopians during the Ogaden War and 
Djibouti’s declaration of independence, both in 1977, shattered dreams of a Greater Somalia and 
contributed to a feeling of uneasiness among the Isaaqs (41). In 1988, the SNM attacked the 
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Somali army in Hargeisa. The government responded harshly, with the result of raising morale 
among the Isaaqs, who were able to rally support from other groups and encourage them to 
militarily oppose the central government as well (46). This was when the SNM joined the 
coalition with the USC and SPM to overthrow Siyad Barre. Once this goal was accomplished 
and Mahdi declared himself interim president without consulting the SNM, Somaliland declared 
its independence. 
Within the first three years of its independence, Somaliland was brought to the cusp of 
civil war on two occasions. The first conflict, which began almost immediately after its 
declaration of independence and lasted for ten months (Bradbury 2008, 87), broke out because 
several sub-clans feared the dominance of the group of sub-clans that composed the government 
(Lewis 2010, 161). The conflict was reconciled before it became too violent in a peace talk in 
Djibouti, which formed a representative reconciliation commission (163). The second conflict 
emerged in late 1994 when the Harti sub-clan in eastern Somaliland was unable to get their 
candidate elected as Vice President. Their support for Somaliland waned, and they urged their 
fellow clansmen to seek reinstatement with the rest of Somalia. However, they were 
unsuccessful in doing so, and this conflict, too, was resolved in a meeting of elders and “a series 
of intra- and inter-clan peace meetings” (Bradbury 2008, 122). What followed were six years of 
uninterrupted stability. 
 
Moral Hazard 
 The conflict that emerged between Mahdi’s USC-Mogadishu and Aideed’s USC-Ethiopia 
forces unfolded in large part due to fears among members of opposing clans that they would be 
shut out of decision-making processes. Mahdi felt alienated when Aideed formed the militant 
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wing of the USC; likewise, Aideed felt alienated when Mahdi was declared interim president 
without his consent. The two conflicts in Somaliland resulted from similar fears among several 
different Isaaq sub-clans. Whereas in the southern region, these clan-based conflicts have 
resulted in 23 years of virtually nonstop civil war, in Somaliland, both conflicts were short-lived 
and cut short before they were able to escalate into full-scale civil war. This can largely be 
attributed to the moral hazard problems created in the south by insurgent groups with access to 
humanitarian aid. 
 In the south, availability of humanitarian aid resources created an incentive for rebel 
groups to continue the conflict, if not for any reason but simply that they were able to do so. 
Despite 15 international attempts at bringing the fighting factions in the south to peace 
conferences (for instance, Djibouti I and Djibouti II in 1991, the UN Conference on National 
Reconciliation in Addis Ababa in 1993, and Kenya in 2000) (Bradbury 2008, 2), each believed it 
more beneficial to continue the conflict, because the spoils of victory associated with beating out 
an opposing group far outweighed whatever peace deal they could reach. In this way, “social 
upheaval in the south degenerated into a war of attrition” (Lewis 2010, 146), largely fueled by 
the vast quantity of and accessibility to foreign-provided humanitarian aid. 
In Somaliland, on the other hand, an almost complete absence of aid meant that militias 
were ill-equipped, and were therefore forced to seek peaceful solutions after relatively very little 
fighting. It is interesting to note that, in 1992, when some international organizations returned to 
Somaliland, the humanitarian aid provided served as a spark for the internal conflict in Berbera 
(Bradbury 2008, 92). This demonstrates just how responsive situations can be to the availability 
of humanitarian aid because of the moral hazard problems that it creates. 
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VII. Conclusion 
 
 In a world that is becoming increasingly more globalized every day, foreign aid has come 
to play a major role. However, as more research is conducted, the benefits of various types of 
foreign aid are beginning to be doubted; aid is no longer viewed universally as a golden elevator, 
designed to bring impoverished or conflict-prone countries up to par with developed nations. 
Critics have questioned whether development aid actually generates its intended economic 
growth, or whether it merely fosters corruption and inefficient resource allocation. They have 
questioned whether military aid actually enables governments of conflict-afflicted states to put 
down insurgencies, or whether it has the opposite effect, incentivizing resource-hungry leaders to 
live in a state of perpetual conflict so that they continue receiving aid. More recently, they have 
even begun to question the efficacy of humanitarian aid, often seen as the form of foreign aid 
least likely to do any harm. 
 The analysis I performed in this paper demonstrates that the effect of humanitarian aid on 
the duration of civil conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa is both positive and statistically significant at 
a confidence level of at least 99%. Further, this relationship is substantively significant; on 
average, a one percent increase in levels of humanitarian aid to a Sub-Saharan African country 
increases the length of the conflict by almost 1.5 times. 
 The Somali Civil War and the relative peace in the northwestern region of Somaliland 
offer a good case study to determine why this relationship exists. Humanitarian aid was largely 
absent from Somaliland during the 1990s and 2000s, whereas it was abundant in the southern 
and central regions of Somalia. This abundance of aid was exploited by insurgent groups, who 
sought food and medical resources for their troops. Further, its availability created a moral 
hazard problem among competing militias, incentivizing them to continue fighting, rather than 
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cutting their losses and negotiating a peace deal. The presence of humanitarian aid, therefore, 
perpetuated conflict in the south, whereas its absence contributed to the relative peace found in 
Somaliland during the same time. 
 My findings shed light on several interesting points for both policymaking and future 
research. First and foremost, they suggest that nations should not be so generously carefree with 
their humanitarian aid disbursements to conflict areas, as aid unquestionably contributes to the 
war economy and perpetuates conflict. Further, that my findings for North African cases were 
very different from those for Sub-Saharan Africa is a point of interest for both future research 
and, ultimately, the development of new policy objectives. That a one percent increase in 
humanitarian aid to a North African country has the result of increasing the likelihood that a 
conflict will end by almost four times (whereas the same increase in aid has the opposite effect in 
Sub-Saharan Africa) could suggest that, while governments international NGOs should proceed 
with caution in Sub-Saharan Africa, they should be less hesitant about distributing food and 
medical aid in conflict regions in North Africa. Future research should emphasize clarifying 
what, in particular, can account for this difference. If it can be attributed to differences in 
institutional and governmental efficiency, developed country governments should focus their 
policies in the developing world on improving institutions so that they become comparable to 
those found in North Africa. 
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TABLE 1: 
Linear Regression Results 
Variable Coefficient 
(Std Error) 
CO2 1358.731*** 
(35.159) 
Phone 12.919*** 
(1.820) 
Life Expectancy 14.047* 
(7.827) 
Constant -13.350 
(405.061) 
N 232 
Notes: Significance levels: *** is <0.001, ** is <0.05, * is <0.10 
 
Year Somalia Per Capita GDP 
Estimate 
(2005 USD) 
2000 814.86 
2005 917.88 
2006 923.05 
2007 928.22 
2008 929.51 
2009 943.56 
2010 942.26 
2011 942.26 
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TABLE 2: 
Accelerated Failure Time Survival Regression Models: Lognormal 
(Full Model Results) 
Variable With Missing 
Values 
With Somalia GDP/Capita 
Estimate 
Log(aid) 0.037*** 
(0.010) 
0.039*** 
(0.010) 
Ruggedness -0.017 
(0.014) 
-0.017 
(0.013) 
Diamonds -0.017 
(0.043) 
-0.011 
(0.043) 
Oil -0.040 
(0.041) 
-0.050 
(0.040) 
GDP/capita 0.000*** 
(0.000) 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
Constant 
 
9.545*** 
(0.057) 
9.536*** 
(0.058) 
N 219 219 
Episodes 64 64 
Notes: Significance levels: *** is <0.001, ** is <0.05, * is <0.10 
 
TABLE 3: 
Accelerated Failure Time Survival Regression Models: Lognormal 
Variable Sub-Saharan Africa North Africa 
Log(aid) 0.441** 
(0.174) 
-3.605** 
(1.194) 
Ruggedness 0.052 
(0.191) 
-41.391** 
(14.416) 
Diamonds -0.120 
(0.412) 
-- 
Oil -0.285 
(0.608) 
-- 
GDP/Capita -0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
Constant 
 
4.886*** 
(0.765) 
49.514*** 
(14.134) 
N 179 40 
Episodes 59 5 
Notes: Sub-Saharan African model includes GDP/capita estimates for Somalia. Significance 
levels: *** is <0.001, ** is <0.05, * is <0.10 
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FIGURE 1: 
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